The growing need for labeled training data has made crowdsourcing an important part of machine learning. The quality of crowdsourced labels is, however, adversely affected by three factors: (1) the workers are not experts; (2) the incentives of the workers are not aligned with those of the requesters; and (3) the interface does not allow workers to convey their knowledge accurately, by forcing them to make a single choice among a set of options. In this paper, we address these issues by introducing approval voting to utilize the expertise of workers who have partial knowledge of the true answer, and coupling it with a ("strictly proper") incentivecompatible compensation mechanism. We show rigorous theoretical guarantees of optimality of our mechanism together with a simple axiomatic characterization. We also conduct empirical studies on Amazon Mechanical Turk which validate our approach.
Introduction
In the big data era, with the ever increasing complexity of machine learning models such as deep learning, the demand for large amounts of labeled data is growing at an unprecedented scale. A primary means of label collection is crowdsourcing, through commercial web services like Amazon Mechanical Turk where crowdsourcing workers or annotators perform tasks in exchange for monetary payments. Crowdsourcing is used extensively by both industry [GMUCtFiMD15, Yes15] and academia [CBW + 10, NWC + 11, KSH12] alike. Unfortunately, the data obtained via crowdsourcing is typically highly erroneous [KKKMF11, VdVE11, WLC + 10] due to the lack of expertise of workers, lack of appropriate incentives, and often the lack of an appropriate interface for the workers to express their knowledge. The quality of data may be improved via statistical aggregation methods [KOS11, ZPBM12, IPSW14], or by accounting for these errors in the machine learning algorithms that employ this data [CDGL01, LLYL04]. Our approach complements these techniques in that we endeavor to directly obtain higher-quality labels via novel incentive mechanisms while not increasing the expenses.
The typical crowdsourcing labeling task consists of a set of questions such as images to be labeled, and each question is associated with a set of options. Each option is the name of a category and the true label for any question is one of these options. In principle, for each question, the worker is required to select the option that she believes is most likely to be true. More formally, it involves eliciting the mode of the worker's belief for each question. Such a "single-selection" crowdsourcing setting has been studied extensively, both empirically and theoretically.
In this paper, we instead consider an approval-voting [BF78] means of eliciting data from the workers, where the worker is allowed to select multiple options for every question. See Figure 1 for an example. Approval voting has been shown to have many advantages over single-selection systems in social choice theory [BF78] ; approval voting provides voters more flexibility to express their beliefs, and utilizes the expertise of voters with partial knowledge more effectively. In the setting of crowdsourcing, as compared to single-selection, selecting multiple options would allow for obtaining more information about the partial knowledge of these non-expert workers. This additional information is particularly valuable for difficult labeling questions, allowing for the identification of the sources of difficulty. Under this approval-voting interface, we will require a worker to select every option which she believes could possibly be correct. Mathematically, we formulate this problem as eliciting the support of the beliefs of workers for each question.
We illustrate the setting of approval voting using the example shown in Figure 1 . Assume that there are two workers. The first worker believes the true label to be either "sand" or "brick", but certainly not any other option; the second worker is confused about some other aspect of the image, and believes the true label to be either "sand", "grass" or "gravel", but certainly none of the others. If each worker is allowed to select only a single answer, it may turn out that the first worker selects "sand" and the second worker selects "grass". Their responses will thus not provide any definitive answer about the true label. In contrast, if we fully elicit their knowledge by letting them select multiple options, that is, ("sand", "brick") from the first worker and ("sand", "grass", "gravel") from the other worker, "sand" becomes a clear winner. This option is indeed the true label for this image. The general phenomenon at work here is that dealing with "erasures" (partial data) is usually easier than dealing with "errors" (noisy data), both in terms of the computational complexity as well as statistical accuracy [Mit, RT09, KLM01, GI04, Riz97].
Albeit its great flexibility in eliciting partial knowledge, approval voting alone is not sufficient for high quality crowdsourcing. A worker may have no incentives to truthfully disclose her partial knowledge on the crowdsourcing question. For instance, the worker may simply choose all provided options as her answer and get paid. To address this problem, we need to couple approval voting with an appropriate "incentive-compatible" payment mechanism such that a worker receives her maximum expected payment if and only if she truthfully discloses her partial knowledge (i.e., the support of her belief) on the crowdsourcing question. In other words, the payment mechanism has to be a "strictly proper scoring rule". Moreover, we want to pay as less as possible to a worker who simply selects all provided options as her answer. We develop a payment mechanism and show that it is the only mechanism which satisfies these two requirements.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2. The problem setup is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show an impossibility result which leads us to introduce "coarse beliefs" in Section 5. We present our mechanism in Section 6 and show that it is the only mechanism which satisfies the basic requirements that we discussed above. In Section 7, we develop more properties of our mechanism including an axiomatic characterization. We report experimental results in Section 8. Finally, we conclude this paper with discussions on future work in Section 9.
Related Literature
Approval voting [Ott77, KM77, Web77, BF78] is a form of voting in which each voter can "approve of" (i.e., select) multiple candidates. No further preferences among these candidates is specified by the voter. Our proposed interface for crowdsourcing elicits approvals on the candidate options for each question. Closer to our setting of crowdsourcing, approval voting has been studied in the context of question and answer forums [JCP09] and Doodle polls [ZMP14] . The focus of the present paper is on the design of incentive mechanisms with properties that fundamentally hold irrespective of the nature of the setting.
The framework of scoring rules [Bri50, Sav71, GR07, LS09] considers the design of payment mechanisms to elicit predictions about an event that is about to occur in the future. The payment is a function of the agent's response and the actual outcome of the event. The payment is called "strictly proper" if its expectation, with respect to the belief of the agent about the event, is strictly maximized when the agent reports her true belief. Proper scoring rules however provide a very broad class of mechanisms, and do not specify any specific mechanism for use. The mechanism proposed in the present paper may alternatively be viewed as the "optimal" proper scoring rules for eliciting supports of workers' beliefs across multiple questions.
The paper [SZ14] considers a crowdsourcing setup with the traditional single-selection setting, also eliciting the workers' confidences for each response. A proposed mechanism is shown to be the only one satisfying a proposed 'no-free-lunch' axiom. While the setting of our work is different from that of [SZ14], interestingly, our mechanism that was derived for a different interface and under a different set of assumptions, turns out to be the only mechanism that can satisfy the nofree-lunch axiom (adapted to our setting). We also give an empirical comparison our mechanism to that proposed in [SZ14] .
The mechanisms presented subsequently assume the presence of some "gold standard" questions whose answers are known apriori to the system designer. There is a parallel line of literature [Pre04, MRZ05, FJPT14, MRZ05, DG13] that explores the design of mechanisms that operate in the absence of any gold standard questions. These works typically elicit additional information from the workers, asking them to predict the responses of other workers. The mechanisms designed can generally provide only weaker guarantees due to the absence of a gold standard answer to compare with.
As discussed earlier, there are several works that improve the data quality via aggregation techniques to perform inference from the data obtained [RYZ + 10, ZPBM12, DS79, KOS11, LPI12, IPSW14, ZLP + 14, WJ11, CBCTH13, KHH12, VVV13]. In addition, many machine learning algorithms accommodating errors in the data have also been designed [AL88, CDGL01, LLYL04, CWZ04]. Our work complements these approaches in that we endeavor to directly obtain higherquality data from crowdsourcing platforms.
Problem Setup
Setting: Consider N ≥ 1 questions, each of which has B ≥ 2 options to choose from. For each option, exactly one of the B options is correct. We assume that these N questions contain G (1 ≤ G ≤ N ) "gold standard" questions, i.e., questions to which the mechanism designer knows the answers apriori. These gold standard questions are assumed to be mixed uniformly at random among the N questions, and the worker is evaluated based on her performance on these G questions. For every individual question, we assume that the worker has, in her mind, a distribution over the B options representing her beliefs of the probabilities of the respective options being correct. We assume that these belief-distributions of a worker are independent across questions. For any integer K, we will use [K] as a shorthand for the set {1, . . . , K}.
Our goal is to elicit, for every question, the support of the worker's distribution over the B options. In other words, we wish to incentivize the worker such that for each question, the worker should select the smallest subset of the set of options such that the correct answer according to her belief lies in the selected subset. Suppose that for any question i ∈ [N ], the worker believes that the probability of option b ∈ [B] being correct is p ib , for some non-negative values p i1 , . . . , p iB that sum to one. Then the goal is to incentivize the worker to, for each question i ∈ [N ], select precisely the set of options
(1)
Payment function: As mentioned earlier, the worker's performance is evaluated based on her responses to the gold standard questions. For any question in the gold standard, we denote the evaluation of the worker's performance on this question by a value in the set {−(B − 1), . . . , −1, 1, . . . , B}: the magnitude of this value represents the number of options she had selected and the sign is positive if the correct answer was in that subset and negative otherwise. For instance, if the worker selected four options for a certain gold standard question but none of them was correct, then the evaluation of this response is denoted as "-4"; if the worker selects two options for a gold standard question and one of them turns out to be the correct option then the evaluation of this response is denoted as "+2". Let
denote the payment function. It is this function f which must be designed in order to incentivize the worker. Note that we restrict the payment f to be non-negative to adhere to present crowdsourcing setups which deal solely in monetary compensations. Finally, we let α > 0 denote the value of perfect data: a worker who answers everything perfectly should be paid an amount α, i.e.,
Throughout the paper, we will consider only those mechanisms that satisfy (2). Expected payment: A quantity central to our analysis will be the expected payment, where the expectation is from the point of view of the worker, and is taken over the randomness in the choice of the G gold standard questions among the N questions and over the N probability distributions representing her beliefs for the N questions. Let us formalize this notion. Suppose that for question i ∈ [N ], the worker has selected some y i ∈ [B] of the B options. Further, let s i ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability, under the worker's beliefs, that the correct answer to question i lies in this set of y i selected options. In other words, s i denotes the sum of the beliefs for the y i options selected by the worker (consequently, the sum of the beliefs for the options not selected is (1 − s i )). Then from the worker's point of view, her expected payment for this selection is
The outer summation in (3) corresponds to the expectation with respect to the random distribution of the G gold standard questions in the N total questions, and the inner summation corresponds to the expectation with respect to the worker's beliefs of her choices being correct. In this paper, we assume that the workers aim to maximize their expected rewards; extending our theory to more general utility functions is straightforward. Goal: The goal is to design mechanisms that are incentive compatible:
Definition 1 (Incentive-compatible mechanism). We will call a payment f "incentive compatible" if the expectation of the payment (3), from the worker's point of view, is strictly maximized when the worker selects precisely the support (1) of her beliefs for each question.
Observe that a worker who selects all the options for all the questions doesn't give any useful information. In order to deter such behavior, one would like to ensure that in addition to paying a (large enough) amount α to a good worker, the mechanism should expend as small an amount as possible on such a worker. This leads to a notion of 'frugality':
for every incentive-compatible mechanism f that has f (1, . . . , 1) = f (1, . . . , 1).
The goal is to design mechanisms that are incentive-compatible, and whenever they exist, find the mechanism(s) that is(are) most frugal.
Finally, we note that the setting described above closely follows that assumed in the extensive literature on strictly proper scoring rules (e.g., [GR07]). The mechanism proposed in the present paper may alternatively be viewed as the "optimal" and "unique" strictly proper scoring rule for the setting described above.
An Impossibility Result
It turns out that, unfortunately, we must face a roadblock in the first step: We can show that there exists no mechanism that is incentive compatible.
Theorem 4.1. For any N , G and B ≥ 2, there is no mechanism that can guarantee that the worker will be incentivized to select precisely the support of her distribution for each question.
The proof of this and other theoretical results (except Theorem 6.1) are provided in the supplementary material.
In order to circumvent this impossibility result, we will appeal to a certain well-understood property of human belief.
Coarse Beliefs
There is an extensive literature in psychology establishing the coarseness of processing and perception in humans. For instance, Miller's celebrated paper [Mil56] establishes the information and storage capacity of humans, that an average human being can typically distinguish at most about seven states. This granualrity of human computation has been verified in many subsequent experiments [SN94, SO03]. The paper [JL13] establishes the ineffectiveness of finer-granularity response elicitation. In [MSS08], the authors hypothesize that humans often group things into categories; this hypothesis is experimentally verified in [Sid11] in a specific setting. We incorporate this established notion of coarseness of human processing in our model in terms of a simple assumption.
Consider any (fixed and known) value ρ > 0 such that the probability of any option for any question, according to the worker's belief, is either zero or greater than ρ. The impossibility shown in Theorem 4.1 pertains to ρ = 0. Also, one must necessarily take into account situations when a worker is totally clueless about a question, i.e., her belief is distributed uniformly over all options; hence we restrict ρ < 1 B . To summarize, we make the following 'coarse belief' assumption.
Definition 3 (Coarse belief assumption). The worker's belief for any option for any question for any lies in the set {0} ∪ (ρ, 1] for some (fixed and known) ρ ∈ 0,
The goal is to design mechanisms that are incentive-compatible and frugal, assuming the coarse belief assumption holds true.
Mechanism
We now present a mechanism for the problem at hand, under the coarse beliefs assumption. The mechanism is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Incentive mechanism for subset selection • Input: Evaluations (x 1 , . . . , x G ) ∈ {−(B − 1), . . . , −1, 1, . . . , B} G of the worker's answers to the G gold standard questions.
• Output: The payment is
It is easy to describe the mechanism in words. The payment is based only on the evaluation of the worker's responses to the gold standard questions. The payment is zero if the correct answer is not selected for any of the questions; otherwise it equals α reduced by (100ρ)% for each option selected in addition to the correct options.
The following pair of theorems present our main results, proving that this mechanism is the one and only mechanism that satisfies our requirements.
Theorem 6.1. The mechanism of Algorithm 1 is incentive-compatible and frugal.
The following theorem shows that our mechanism is strictly better than any other mechanism.
Theorem 6.2. There is no other incentive-compatible mechanism that expends as small an amount as Algorithm 1 on a worker who does not attempt any question.
Remark 1. The proofs of optimality and uniqueness in Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.2 respectively prove the absence of other good mechanisms via contradiction-based arguments. Specifically, for any candidate mechanism, they identify a specific set of beliefs for which the worker will not be incentivized. In line with our earlier argument of beliefs being "coarse", the beliefs considered in these proofs are simple enough in that the worker may have some belief about one of the options, are indifferent among few other options, and know for sure that that rest are incorrect.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 6.1. The reader may feel free to jump to Section 7 without any loss in continuity.
Towards proving the working of Algorithm 1, we first present a lemma that will form the workhorse of this and other subsequent proofs. The proof of this lemma is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 6.3. Consider some y, y ∈ [B] N and some I ⊆ [N ] such that y i = y i + 1 for all i ∈ I, and y i = y i for all i / ∈ I. Then any incentive compatible mechanism f must necessarily satisfy
Furthermore, a necessary condition for the above equation to be satisfied with equality is
6.1 Proof of Theorem 6.1
Incentive compatibility: Let us first consider the case N = G = 1. In this case, the mechanism of Algorithm 1 reduces to
Suppose without loss of generality that the worker's beliefs for the B options are
. An incentive-compatible mechanism must strictly maximize the worker's expected payment when she selects the support of her belief, i.e., options {1, . . . , m}. The expected payment, $ sup , under this selection is
Suppose the worker selects some other set of options {o 1 , .
. Then her expected payment $ oth under the proposed mechanism for this selection is
Thus the expected payment under the choice = m but with a selection different from the support is strictly lower than $ sup . Also observe that the expected payment on selecting > m is (1−ρ) −1 , which is strictly lower than $ sup . Let us now consider the remaining, interesting case of < m.
This completes the proof for the case N = G = 1. Let us now consider the case of N = G ≥ 1. By our assumption of the independence of the beliefs of the worker across the questions, the expected payment equals
Since the payments are non-negative, if each individual component in the product is maximized then the product is also necessarily maximized. Each individual component simply corresponds to the setting of N = G = 1 discussed earlier. Thus calling upon our earlier result, we get that the expected payment for the case N = G ≥ 1 is maximized when the worker acts as desired for every question. Let us finally consider the general case of N ≥ G ≥ 1. Recall from (3) that the expected payment for the general case is a cascade of two expectations: the outer expectation is with respect to the uniformly random distribution of the G gold standard questions among the N total questions, while the inner expectation is taken over the worker's beliefs of the different questions conditioned on the choice of the gold standard questions. The arguments above for the case N = G prove that every individual term in the inner expectation is maximized when the worker acts as desired. The expected payment is thus maximized when the worker acts as desired.
Frugality: Consider any incentive compatible mechanism f such that f (1, . . . , 1) = α. Consider any x 0 ∈ [B − 1]. Applying Lemma 6.3 with y = (x 0 + 1, . . . , x 0 + 1) and y = (x 0 , . . . , x 0 ) gives
A repeated application of this inequality for all
The mechanism of Algorithm 1 achieves this lower bound on f (B, . . . , B) with equality, thereby completing the proof.
Additional Properties of the Mechanism
We earlier made the "coarse belief" assumption that the worker's belief for any option, when nonzero, is atleast ρ. We then designed the mechanism of Algorithm 1 that is incentive compatible with respect to eliciting the supports of the beliefs of the worker. Let us now complete the picture by supposing that workers may arbitrary beliefs, and investigate the performance of Algorithm 1.
Incentivizing Workers with Finer Beliefs
Suppose the mechanism of Algorithm 1, for a certain value of ρ, is encountered by a worker who may have arbitrary beliefs. Interestingly, it turns out that the mechanism doesn't break down, but instead does something desirable: it incentivizes the worker to select all options that contribute significantly enough to the pool of selected options.
Theorem 7.1. Under the mechanism of Algorithm 1, for any question, a worker with beliefs 1 ≥ p 1 ≥ . . . ≥ p B ≥ 0 will be incentivized to select options {1, . . . , m} where
It is not hard to interpret this incentivized action. Start by selecting the option believed to have the highest chance of being correct, then select the option with the next highest chance of being correct, and so on. Stop whenever the next option to be selected cannot contribute any more than a fraction ρ to the total likelihood of correctness.
Let us now verify that the earlier result of Theorem 6.1 for "coarse beliefs" is indeed a special case of Theorem 7.1. To this end, suppose the beliefs of the worker for any particular question are
It follows that under the result of Theorem 7.1, a worker with "coarse beliefs" will be incentivized to select precisely the support of her beliefs.
An Alternate Axiomatic Derivation
We now present an alternative axiomatic derivation of our mechanism when accommodating workers with arbitrary beliefs. The derivation involves the "no-free-lunch axiom" proposed in [SZ14], which when adapted to our approval-voting based setting is defined as:
Definition 4 (No-free-lunch; adapted from [SZ14]). If every attempted question in the gold standard turns out to be wrong, then the worker gets a payment of zero, i.e., The no-free-lunch axiom is quantitatively different from the criterion of frugality proposed in this paper. However, both these notions have the same qualitative goal, namely to minimize the expenditure when no useful data is obtained, while providing higher payments to workers providing better data. Interestingly, as we show below, both these notions lead to the same (unique) mechanism under our setting of approval voting.
Theorem 7.2. Consider no assumptions on the minimum value of the belief, and suppose the workers must be incentivized to select options {1, . . . , m} where m = arg max z pz z i=1 p i > ρ . Then, the mechanism of Algorithm 1 is the one and only mechanism that is incentive compatible and satisfies no-free-lunch.
This alternate axiomatic derivation thus forms one more reason to consider the mechanism of Algorithm 1. We believe that our mechanism will also draw more experts to the crowdsourcing platform since their compensation will be significantly larger than that of mediocre workers, unlike most compensation mechanisms in current use.
Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk
This section presents results from an evaluation of our proposed mechanism on the popular Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com) commercial crowdsourcing platform. While our primary contributions remain the theoretical results presented earlier, the goal of this experimental exercise was to perform a first order check on whether our mechanism has the potential to work in practice.
We compared the mechanism of Algorithm 1 to three other mechanisms: a single-selection interface with additive payments, a single-selection interface with an option to skip with multiplicative payments [SZ14], and an approval-voting interface with a fixed payment. The mechanisms were executed as a "bonus payment" based on the evaluation of the worker's performance on the gold standard questions.
We conducted two sets of experiments, with 203 workers in each experiment. In either experiment, each worker was assigned one of the four mechanisms uniformly at random. The order of the questions as well as the order of the options was chosen randomly for each worker. A significant component of the task on Amazon Mechanical Turk was devoted to explain the mechanisms to the workers by means of precise instructions and extensive examples. The simplicity of our mechanism certainly helped in this regard. Details of these experiments are as follows. The entire data related to the experiments is available on the website of the first author.
Details of Experiments
Identifying Textures: This experiment involved N = 16 questions, each of which was a monochrome image that contained a certain texture. The data set is a part of the USC-SIPI Image database [USC15]. Figure 1 depicts one of these questions, and lists the B = 6 different options that were presented to the worker for each question. The workers were told that G = 3 questions were in the gold standard. The details of the four mechanisms are as follows:
• Single-selection interface with additive payments: The bonus started at zero and increased by 15 cents for every correct answer.
• Skip-based single-selection interface with multiplicative payments: The bonus started at 50 cents, reduced by 40% for each skipped question, and became zero in case of an incorrect answer.
• Approval-voting interface with a fixed payment: The bonus was fixed at 30 cents.
• Approval-voting interface with Algorithm 1's payment: The bonus started at 50 cents, reduced by 10% for each incorrect option selected, and became zero if the correct option was not selected for any question.
Recognizing Languages: This experiment involved N = 25 questions, each of which was an image that contained text whose language was to be identified. The images were collected with the help of online search engines. Figure 4 depicts a sample question from this task. As seen in the figure, there were B = 8 different options that were presented to the worker for each question. The workers were told that G = 4 questions were in the gold standard. The details of the four mechanisms are as follows:
• Single-selection interface with additive payments: The bonus started at zero and increased by 12 cents for every correct answer.
• Skip-based single-selection interface with multiplicative payments: The bonus started at 70 cents, reduced by 50% for each skipped question, and became zero in case of an incorrect answer.
• Approval-voting interface with a fixed payment: The bonus was fixed at 35 cents.
• Approval-voting interface with Algorithm 1's payment: The bonus started at 70 cents, reduced by 10% for each incorrect option selected, and became zero if the correct option was not selected for any question. Select ALL options that could be the language in this image.
Evaluation

Figure 4:
Illustration of an experiment that asked workers to recognize the language shown in an image.
- We can see that our mechanism is associated to a very little or no increase in the net expenditure. All in all, these experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk show that our mechanism is indeed practical and can potentially be useful for many applications in machine learning.
Discussion and Future Work
We take an approval-voting based approach towards gathering labeled data from crowdsourcing.
In particular, we use the approval-voting interface to elicit the support of the beliefs of workers. This approach is complementary to that of eliciting a single answer (the mode of the belief), and may often be able to utilize more effectively the expertise of workers who have partial knowledge of the true answer. We design an incentive mechanism that is rooted in fundamental theory, and validate it experimentally in real-world scenarios.
Our goal is to deliver quality of labels for machine learning applications, at the same or lower costs, by means of incentive mechanisms or aggregation algorithms or both. In this paper, we pursued the former approach. In particular, we saw earlier that our proposed mechanism was successful in converting a significant number of "errors" into "erasures", a property that is known to improve the efficacy of subsequent processing algorithms [Mit, RT09, KLM01, GI04, Riz97]. For the traditional single-selection setting, there is a long, existing line of work on statistical methods to aggregate redundant noisy data from multiple workers [RYZ + 10, ZPBM12, DS79, KOS11, LPI12, IPSW14
]. An open problem is the design of aggregation algorithms for the approval-voting-based data; algorithms that exploit the specific structure of the responses due to the interface and the mechanism proposed in this paper. There is indeed work on aggregation algorithms [MV08, CKM10, BK14] and probabilistic models [Mar93, FR96, DPR04, RT04] for approval-voting in the literature social choice theory; their objective, however, is primarily of fairness and stretgyproofing of the voting procedure, as opposed to our goal of noise removal as required for labeling tasks in crowdsourcing.
[ We assume that there indeed exists some incentive-compatible payment function f , and prove a contradiction. Let us first consider the special case of N = G = 1 and B = 2. Since N = G = 1, there is only one question. Let p 1 > 0.5 be the probability, according to the belief of the worker, that option 1 is correct; the worker then believes that option 2 is correct with probability (1 − p 1 ).
When p 1 = 1, we need the worker to select option 1 alone. Thus we need
When p 1 ∈ (0.5, 1), we require the worker to select options 1 and 2, as opposed to selecting option 1 alone. For this we need
It follows that we need
However, the inequality (5) is satisfied only when f (1) > f (−1) and
f (1)−f (−1) . Thus for any given payment function f , a worker with belief (1 − p 1 ) ∈ (0,
f (1)−f (−1) ) will not be incentivized to select the support of her belief. This yields a contradiction.
We now move on to the general case of N ≥ G ≥ 1 and B ≥ 2. Consider a worker who is clueless about questions 2 through N (i.e., her belief is uniform across all options for these questions). Suppose this worker selects all B options for these questions as desired. For the first question, suppose that the worker is sure that options 3, . . . , B are incorrect. We are now left with the first question and the first two options for this question. Letting X denote a random variable representing the evaluation of the worker's response to the first question, the expected payment then is
B).
The expectation in the first term is taken with respect to the randomness in X. Defining
and applying the same arguments tof as those for f for the case of N = G = 1, B = 2 above gives the desired contradiction. This thus completes the proof of impossibility.
Remark 2. We can use the techniques developed in this section to prove a stronger result: Consider any value T ∈ [0, 1]. A natural goal is to design a mechanism such that for any question, the worker is incentivized to select the smallest subset of items whose combined belief is T or larger; if there are multiple such smallest subsets then the worker should be incentivized to select the subset among these that has the largest combined belief. The case of T = 1 degenerates to Theorem 4.1, the case of T ∈ [0,
1 B ] degenerates to the traditional single-selection setting, and the case of B = 2, T ∈ ( 1 B , 1) degenerates to the skip-based setting of [SZ14]. We can show that for the remaining parameter space, i.e., for any value of B ≥ 3, T ∈ ( 1 B , 1), and N ≥ G ≥ 1, there exists no incentive-compatible mechanism.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 6.3
Consider some ρ 0 ∈ (ρ,
We will compare the aforementioned action to another action, where for each question i ∈ I, the worker selects only the last (y i − 1) options but not the first option; for each question i / ∈ I, the worker selects the support of her belief. Under this action, the expected payment $ 2 is
In the expression (7), the outer summation represents the expectation over the random choice of the G gold standard questions among the N questions. The inner summation represents the expectation with respect to the correctness or incorrectness of the answers to the G gold standard questions: for any question i, i = 1 captures the event where the i th question in the gold standard is answered correctly and i = −1 represents the event of this question being answered incorrectly. The term 1{{j i | i = −1} ⊆ I} ensures that only the questions in I can be wrong, since it is only these questions for which the worker has selected a subset of her belief's support. Since f (x) ≥ 0 for all x, we can lower bound $ 2 as
An incentive compatible mechanism must incentivize the worker to perform the first action (over the second), i.e, must have $ 1 > $ 2 . Thus from (6) and (8), we get
Note that (9) must hold for all ρ 0 > ρ. The left hand side of (9) does not involve ρ 0 whereas the right hand side is continuous in ρ 0 . It follows that
This proves the first part of the lemma. We now move on to the second part of the lemma, concerning equality in (10). Suppose f ( 1 y j 1 , . . . , G y j G ) is strictly positive for any (j 1 , . .
∈ I}. Then (10) will necessarily be a strict inequality. The claimed necessary condition for equality is thus established.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 6.1
A.3.1 Incentive compatibility
Let us first consider the case N = G = 1. In this case, the mechanism of Algorithm 1 reduces to f (x) = α(1 − ρ) (x 1 −1) 1{x 1 ≥ 0}. Suppose without loss of generality that the worker's beliefs for the B options are
. An incentive-compatible mechanism must strictly maximize the worker's expected payment when she selects the support of her belief, i.e., options {1, . . . , m}. The expected payment, $ sup , under this selection is given by
Suppose the worker chooses to select a different set of options {o 1 , .
. Then her expected payment $ under the proposed mechanism for this selection is
If = m then the inequality in (11) is strict since p j < p i whenever j > m and i ≤ m. Thus the expected payment under the choice = m but with a selection different from the support is strictly lower than $ sup . Also observe that the expected payment on selecting > m is clearly strictly lower than $ sup . Let us now consider the remaining, interesting case of < m. Since
This argument completes the proof for the case N = G = 1. Let us now consider the case of N = G ≥ 1. By our assumption of the independence of the beliefs of the worker across the questions, the expected payment equals
Since the payments are non-negative, if each individual component in the product is maximized then the product is also necessarily maximized. Each individual component simply corresponds to the setting of N = G = 1 discussed earlier. Thus calling upon our earlier result, we get that the expected payment for the case N = G ≥ 1 is maximized when the worker acts as desired for every question. Let us finally consider the general case of N ≥ G ≥ 1. Recall from (3) that the expected payment for the general case is a cascade of two expectations: the outer expectation is with respect to the uniformly random distribution of the G gold standard questions among the N total questions, while the inner expectation is taken over the worker's beliefs of the different questions conditioned on the choice of the gold standard questions and restricts attention to only these G questions. The arguments above for the case N = G prove that every individual term in the inner expectation is maximized when the worker acts as desired. The outer expectation does not affect this argument. The expected payment is thus maximized when the worker acts as desired.
A.3.2 Frugality
Consider any incentive compatible mechanism f such that f (1, . . . , 1) = α. Consider any x 0 ∈ [B − 1]. Applying Lemma 6.3 with y = (x 0 + 1, . . . , x 0 + 1) and y = (x 0 , . . . , x 0 ) gives
The mechanism of Algorithm 1 achieves this lower bound on f (B, . . . , B) with equality.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6.2
Consider any incentive compatible mechanism f such that f (1, . . . , 1) = α and f (B, . . . , B) = (1 − ρ) G(B−1) α. We will show that this payment mechanism must be identical to the mechanism described in Algorithm 1. We consider the set of evaluations x whose elements are non-decreasing, i.e., x 1 ≥ x 2 ≥ · · · ≥ x G ; The proof for any other ordering follows in an identical manner.
First consider any x such that x G > 0.
• Let γ(x) denote the number of distinct entries in x:
• Let σ(x) denote the size of the last jump in x:
σ(x) := x j − x j+1 where j = arg max
• Let β(x) denote the numeric value of x in a B-ary number system:
For example, if B = 5, G = 5 and x = (5, 5, 4, 1, 1) then γ(x) = |{5, 4, 1}| = 3, σ(x) = 4 − 1 = 3 (where j = 3), and β(x) = 4 · 5 4 + 4 · 5 3 + 3 · 5 2 + 0 · 5 1 + 0 · 5 0 = 3075. The proof involves three nested levels of induction: on γ, on σ and then on β.
We first induct on γ. The base case is the set {x|γ(x) = 1}, i.e., the set of vectors which have the same value for all its components. Consider any x 0 ∈ [B − 1]. Applying Lemma 6.3 with y = (x 0 + 1, . . . , x 0 + 1) and y = (x 0 , . . . , x 0 ) gives
Since this inequality is true for every x 0 ∈ [B − 1], we have
Setting f (B, . . . , B) = (1 − ρ) (B−1) α and f (1, . . . , 1) = α proves the base case. Now suppose our hypothesis is true for all {x|γ(x) ≤ γ 0 − 1} for some γ 0 ∈ {2, . . . , B}. We will now prove that the hypothesis is also true for all {x|γ(x) ≤ γ 0 }. Towards this goal, we will now induct on σ. The set of all {x|γ(x) = γ 0 − 1} can be treated as a base case for our induction, with this base case corresponding to σ = 0. Due to the induction hypothesis on γ, the base case of σ = 0 is already proven. Now suppose that the hypothesis is true for all {x|γ(x) = γ 0 , σ(x) ≤ σ 0 − 1} for some σ 0 ∈ [B − 1]. We will prove that the hypothesis remains true for all {x|γ(x) = γ 0 , σ(x) = σ 0 }. To this end, we will induct on β.
Recall that we have restricted our attention to those x which have their elements in a descending order. Observe that the element with the minimum value of β in the set {x|γ(x) = γ 0 , σ(x) = σ 0 } is (γ 0 + σ 0 − 1, . . . , σ 0 + 1, 1, . . . , 1). We will prove the hypothesis for this element as the base case for our induction on β. Applying Lemma 6.3 with y = (γ 0 + σ 0 − 1, . . . , σ 0 + 2, σ 0 + 1, 1, . . . , 1) and y = (γ 0 + σ 0 − 1, . . . , σ 0 + 2, σ 0 , 1, . . . , 1) gives the inequality 
for some positive constants c 1 , c 1 , c s , c s (which represent the probabilities of the respective set of G questions being chosen as the G gold standard questions). Now, for any s {γ 0 +σ 0 −1, . . . , σ 0 +2}, observe that γ(s, σ 0 + 1, 1, . . . , 1) ≤ γ 0 − 1 and γ(s, σ 0 , 1, . . . , 1) ≤ σ 0 − 1. Thus from our induction hypothesis, we have
Also, γ(γ 0 + σ 0 − 1, . . . , σ 0 + 2, σ 0 , 1, . . . , 1) = γ 0 and σ(γ 0 + σ 0 − 1, . . . , σ 0 + 2, σ 0 , 1, . . . , 1) = σ 0 − 1. Consequently from our induction hypothesis, we have
Substituting (13) and (14) in (12) and canceling out common terms gives
We will now derive a matching upper bound on f (γ 0 + σ 0 − 1, . . . , σ 0 + 2, σ 0 + 1, 1, . . . , 1).
and the induction hypothesis is satisfied in the first case. In the second case,
in Lemma 6.3 yields the inequality
First consider the case of N = G = 1. The mechanism of Algorithm 1 reduces to f (x) = α(1 − ρ) (x 1 −1) 1{x 1 ≥ 0}. Suppose without loss of generality that the worker's beliefs for the B options are p 1 ≥ · · · ≥ p B and suppose m = arg max z
> ρ . A mechanism that is incentive compatible will strictly maximize the worker's expected payment when she selects the options {1, . . . , m}.
Suppose a worker decides to select some of the B options, say options {o 1 , . . . , o } ⊆ [B]. Then it is easy to see that her expected payment,
is maximized when she selects options {1, . . . , }, i.e., the options that are most likely to be correct. It remains to show that among all choices of ∈ [B], the expected payment is maximized when the worker selects = m. Let $ denote the expected payment when the worker selects options:
Hence for any ∈ {2, . . . , B}, we have
We know that 
It follows that the worker will be incentivized to choose = m.
Let us now consider the case of N = G ≥ 1. By our assumption of the independence of the beliefs of the worker across the questions, the expected payment equals
Proof of Lemma A.1. First consider the case of G = N . Consider some η, γ ∈ {0, . . . , G − 1} with η + γ < G.
For every question j ∈ [η + γ], suppose the worker's belief is δ j ∈ (0, ρ) for the last option and 1−δ j |x j | each for the first |x j | options. One can verify that since δ j < ρ < 1 B and |x j | ≤ B − 1, it must be that 1−δ j |x j | > δ j , and that incentive-compatibility requires incentivizing the worker to select the first |x j | options. Suppose the worker does so. Now for every question j ∈ {η + γ + 2, . . . , N }, suppose the belief of the worker is uniform across all B options. The worker should be incentivized to select all B options in this case; suppose the worker does so. Finally, for question i, suppose the worker's belief is δ ∈ ( Define {r j } j∈[η+γ] as r j = δ j for j ∈ [η], and r j = 1 − δ j for j ∈ {η + 1, η + γ}. Let := { 1 , . . . , η+γ } ∈ {−1, 1} η+γ . Incentive-compatibility for question i necessitates 
The left hand side of (24) represents a polynomial in (η + γ) variables {r j } η+γ j=1 which evaluates to zero for all values of the variables within an (η + γ)-dimensional solid ball. Thus, the coefficients of the monomials in this polynomial must be zero. In particular, the constant term must be zero.
The constant term appears when j = 1 ∀ j in the summations in (24). Setting the constant term to zero gives The proof now proceeds via an induction on the quantity (G − η − γ − 1). We begin with the case of (G − η − γ − 1) = G − 1 which implies η = γ = 0. In this case (24) simplifies to 1, B, . . . , B) .
Next, we consider the case when (G − η − γ − 1) questions are skipped in the gold standard, and assume that the result is true when more than (G − η − γ − 1) questions are skipped in the gold standard. In (26), the functions g decompose into a sum of the constituent f functions. These constituent functions f are of two types: the first where all of the first (η + γ + 1) questions are included in the gold standard, and the second where one or more of the first (η + γ + 1) questions are not included in the gold standard. The second case corresponds to situations where there are more than (G − η − γ − 1) questions skipped in the gold standard and hence satisfies our induction hypothesis. The terms corresponding to these functions thus cancel out in the expansion of (26). The remainder comprises only evaluations of function f for arguments in which the first (η + γ + 1) questions are included in the gold standard. Since the last (N − η − γ − 1) questions are skipped by the worker, the remainder evaluates to (1 − ρ)c 3 f (x 1 , . . . , x η+γ , x i , B, . . . , B) + ρc 3 f (x 1 , . . . , x η+γ , −x i , B, . . . , B) = c 3 f (x 1 , . . . , x η+γ , x i + 1, B, . . . , B) (27) for some constant c 3 > 0. Dividing throughout by c 3 gives the desired result.
Finally, the arguments above hold for any permutation of the first G questions, thus completing the proof.
